The Choate Lien Doctrine by Burroughs, James D.
THE CHOATE LIEN DOCTRINE*
JAMES D. BURROUGHSt
A TAXPAYER'S creditors may simultaneously include the fed-
eral government, state and local governments, and secured as
well as unsecured commercial creditors. When there are insufficient
funds to satisfy the maturing claims of all creditors, the age-old
problem of priority arises. Ordinarily the lien first in time is first in
right. This rule is based on the common-law equitable principle
that "a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior
satisfaction, out of the subject it binds .... "I
The right of the United States to priority does not arise from the
common law, but depends entirely on statutes. The two principal
statutory provisions are: section 3466 of the Revised Statutes; 2 and
section 6321 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. In recent years
there has been considerable confusion among members of the bar
in the application of these two statutes. The reason for this con-
fusion emanates from opinions of the United States Supreme Court
holding that competing statutory and contractual liens must be
choate before they can compete against the claims of the United
States arising under these two statutes. Early cases used the term
"specific and perfected" but in recent years the courts have often
referred to a "specific and perfected" lien as a choate lien. The
two terms are synonymous.
I
SECTION 3466, REvisED STATUTES
The characterization of liens as choate or inchoate for priority
purposes initially developed from judicial interpretation of cases
arising under section 3466 of the Revised Statutes. This section
provides:
The views expressed are the author's and should not be considered as being
the opinion of the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, or the Chief
Counsel's Office.
t B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1960, University of North Carolina; Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, Atlanta Region, Internal Revenue Service.
"Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827).
2 REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
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Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or when-
ever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or
administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased,
the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied....
Mere inability of a living debtor to pay all his debts does not con-
stitute insolvency within the meaning of this section. A living
debtor's inability to pay must be manifested or accompanied by one
of the three ways pointed out in the explanatory clause of the
section.3 It must appear (a) that the insolvent debtor has made
a voluntary assignment; or (b) the effects of an absconding, con-
cealed, or absent debtor have been attached; or (c) that an act of
bankruptcy has been committed.4 Although it provides that the
priority shall extend to cases where an act of bankruptcy is com-
mitted, the weight of authority indicates that this section is not
applicable when bankruptcy results. The Bankruptcy Act sets
up its own priorities.
Section 3466 is a priority statute which arises at the time of the
definitive act of insolvency.6 It does not create a lien.7 Taxes are
debts within the meaning of the section and are subject to its pro-
tection." While it is not a lien statute, the rules expressed and
uniformly adhered to by the Supreme Court in its decisions under
the section are reflected in the tax lien decisions. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that inchoate liens, that is to say, liens which
are not specific and perfected, do not prevail over debts due the
United States in priority contests.
This section incorporates the priority first given the United
States in 1797,1 and has been described as broad and sweeping and,
on its face, admits of no exception to the priority claims of the
United States. 10 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized
Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 439 (1828); Nolte v. Hudson Nay.
Co., 8 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1925).
'Bramwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483 (1926); United States
v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923); Nolte v. Hudson Nay. Co., 8 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1925).
5 Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912); United
States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955); .United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 791
(9th Cir. 1946).
8 County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 93 (1929).
7Bramwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 488 (1926).
9 Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
0 Derived from Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515; and Act of March 2,
1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 676.
10 United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355 (1945).
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that certain exceptions may be read into the statute. In Thelusson
v. Smith," one of the old and still often quoted cases, a judgment
was held to be in an inferior position because the judgment creditor
had not seized the property under fieri facias. The Court stated
that a divestiture prior to insolvency would defeat the priority, since
the United States must be satisfied out of the debtor's estate. This
reasoning seems to form the basis from which the Court developed
its requirement that the debtor must be divested of title or possession
in order for the competing lien to be perfected.
It was contended in Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co.12 that the
Thelusson case meant that the priority granted by section 3466 was
superior to any lien and that only an absolute conveyance could
defeat the priority. The Court answered by saying that "it has
never yet been decided by this court, that the priority of the United
States will divest a specific lien, attached to a thing, whether it be
accompanied by possession or not."' 3 The explanation of the Court
implied that a specific and perfected lien would prevail over a mere
priority of the United States, but in neither the Thelusson nor the
Conard case did the Supreme Court answer the question. Although
145 years have elapsed since the Thelusson decision, and numerous
cases have brought up the problem, the Supreme Court has been
able to reserve its opinion on the question 4 by assiduously finding
that the liens competing with the federal priority were not sufficiently
specific and perfected.
While the Court has thus far declined to determine whether a
specific and perfected lien would overcome the statutory priority,- it
has not been so reticent in setting forth requirements for a specific
and perfected lien. The lien to be specific must be definite in at
least three respects at the time of the act of insolvency, and not
merely ascertainable in the future. These are: (1) the identity of the
lienor, (2) the amount of the lien, and (3) the property to which it
attaches.' " "It is not enough that the lienor has power to bring
these elements, or any of them, down from broad generality to the
11 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396 (1817).
12 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828).
aid. at 441.
1" United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1953); Illinois ex ret.
Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1946).
'1 United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United
States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
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earth of specific identity."'16 To be perfected, the lien must be
enforced at least to the point of divesting the debtor of either title
or possession.' 7
In County of Spokane v. United States,' the Court held that
liens for county corporation taxes which were assessed against the
debtor's personalty before he went into receivership and before the
section 3466 claim attached were not specific and thus were subordi-
nate to the federal priority. The Supreme Court reasoned that the
liens of the county were not "specific" as to property because they
had not followed the necessary statutory procedure that consisted of
distraining the property subject to their liens. Apparently, the
Court believed that until actual distraint the counties had no way
of knowing what property would be available to pay the taxes; hence,
the liens could not meet the requirement of applying to specific
and definite property.
The Supreme Court of Washington had held the liens of the
two counties were not specific.'9 The United States Supreme Court
said whether or not the liens were specific was a state question and
accepted the ruling of the Washington court. The Court has not
followed this language in subsequent decisions, 20 however, for later
decisions have held that while it is a state question, it is subject to
reexamination by the federal courts. Except for one case,2 ' the
Supreme Court has held all liens decided as choate by state courts
to be inchoate under federal law.
A lien of the State of New York for franchise taxes under state
law was held to be inferior to a debt due the United States.22 The
lien was held not to be specific and perfected, because the liability was
unliquidated and unknown. Although the franchise taxes in ques-
tion were overdue, the state had taken no steps to perfect and
'o Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
irUnited States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953); New York v.
Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
1s 279 U.S. 80 (1929). The state statutes involved provided that if a certain personal
property tax was not paid, and if the personal property against which it had been
assessed was no longer in the hands of the delinquent taxpayer, the amount of the
unpaid tax would become a lien upon all the real and personal property of the tax-
payer. They went on to prescribe the procedure by which the lien was to be enforced.
19 Exchange Nat'l Bank v. United States, 147 Wash. 176, 265 Pac. 722 (1928).
2 Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill,
Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
21 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
22 New York v. Maclay, 288 US. 290 (1933).
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liquidate its liens at the time the receiver was appointed. The
state argued that under the statutes of New York the franchise taxes
are liens in advance for the years in which they are due, though the
amount is not fixed and must be liquidated thereafter. The Court
stated that the lien was not specific in amount since no assessment
had been made,* and that the doctrine of relation back would not
operate to divest the United States of its preference. The Court
made it clear that the tax would not be entitled to priority even if
the amount had been liquidated before rights and interests became
static through insolvency proceedings, for there had been no change
of title or possession.
The priority also prevailed over a state gasoline tax lien which
by state law was declared to be a first and preferred lien prior to any
and all other existing liens upon all the property of any distributor
devoted to or used in his business as a distributor23 The Supreme
Court held that the state lien was neither specific nor constant; the
claim was uncertain as the audit might be incorrect, and the final
amount was left for determination by the courts. It emphasized
that prior to the appointment of the receiver, the state had made
no move to assert its lien. The decision went on to say that once
the priority of the United States had attached, it could not be di-
vested by any subsequent proceedings in connection with the state's
lien, thus reaffirming the language used by the Court in Maclay.2 4
The Court also made it clear that the competing lienor must divest
the taxpayer of either title or possession before the lien would meet
the Court's standard of perfection.
The priority was held superior to a landlord's lien and a munici-
pal tax lien in United States v. Waddill, Holland 6 Flinn, Inc.2 5
The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing the Virginia
Supreme Court, stated that the landlord had only a general power
over unspecified property at the date of assignment and that spe-
cificity was clearly lacking. It found the landlord's lien was not
21 United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
- New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
323 U.S. 353 (1945), reversing 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944). A Virginia
statute authorized the landlord to levy a distraint for six months' rent upon any goods
of an insolvent lessee found on the premises, or which may have been removed there-
from not more than thirty days before the levy. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia declared the statute gave the landlord "a lien which is fixed and specific, and
not one which is merely inchoate, and that such a lien exists independent of the right
of distress or attachment, which are merely remedies for enforcing it. 182 Va. at 363,
28 S.E.2d at 746." Id. at 356.
Vol. 1963: 449)
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
specific as to the amount of the lien, was not definite as to the
property to which the lien attached and that there had been no
divestiture of title or possession. The Court made it clear that
federal law-not state law-controls in determining when a lien
is perfected. The Court also emphasized that the competing liens
must be specific and perfected before the voluntary assignment
takes place. If divestiture of title or possession had occurred before
the assignment, the property would not have passed to the assignee
and the United States would not have had any interest in it. As
was stated in the Thelusson case, the priority of the United States
must be satisfied out of the debtor's estate. This could not have
been done if the landlord had obtained possession of the property
of the debtor prior to insolvency.
The Court also sustained the federal priority as against the city's
personal property tax lien. The city contended that it assessed taxes
on specific items of furniture pursuant to annual levies made by the
city council and that a lien attached to such property on January 1,
by operation of state law. The Supreme Court stated that under
Virginia law the municipal tax confers a lien on personal property
which enables the city to follow it wherever it may be taken only
if the assessment is specifically made on such property. It em-
phasized that until actual distraint there was no certainty as to the
property subject to the lien and no transfer of title or possession
relative to any property.
In Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell," a state lien for unem-
ployment contributions attaching to all the employer's personal
property used in his business was held inchoate by the Supreme
Court. The State of Illinois asserted that the lien became specific
and perfected when notice of the lien had been filed and recorded
and when the receiver had been appointed. The lien attached only
to personal property used by the employer "in conection with his
trade, occupation, profession or business." Under these circum-
stances, the Court held that there was here (1) no lack of identity
of the lienor, (2) no lack of specificity as to the amount of the
lien, but there was (3) a lack of definiteness as to the property to
which the lien attached.
Here, as in United States v. Texas,27 the Court stated that the
2.829.U.S. 362 (1946).
2 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
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property subject to the lien was neither specific nor constant. It
went on to say that the goods subject to the lien had not severed
themselves from the general and free assets of the owner from which
the claims of the United States were entitled to priority of payment.
"Indeed, . . .not only was the property not in the hands of the
bailiff, but so far as appears the amount or type of property belong-
ing to the debtor was not known to the state."28  The Court con-
cluded that the state had acquired neither title nor possession as of
the crucial date, which was the date the receiver was appointed.
United States v. Gilbert Associates29 involved a priority issue
between the government for employment, withholding and corpo-
rate income taxes and the Town of Walpole, New Hampshire, for
an ad valorem tax on certain machinery of Gilbert Associates. The
United States relied on both section 5670 of the 1989 Code and on
section 3466 of the Revised Statutes. In point of time the local tax
assessments were prior, and the New Hampshire law provided that
such assessments were in the nature of a judgment. On this basis
the town contended that it was a judgment creditor within the
meaning of section 3672 of the 1939 Code and that the Government's
lien was not valid against the town, as the notice of federal tax lien
was not filed until after the local tax lien arose. The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court upheld this contention.30
As for the argument that the town was a judgment creditor, the
United States Supreme Court was careful to point out that the state
of New Hampshire was free to give its interpretation for the purpose
28 329 U.S. at 373. One state court has regarded a lien on all the debtor's real and
personal property as choate, because it requires no selection or identification. State v.
Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 46 So. 2d 553 (1950). But cf. United States v. Williams, 139
F. Supp. 94 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
20 345 U.S. 361 (1953). The town property tax arose on April 1, 1947, and April 1,
1948. The federal taxes became due between 1943 and June 30, 1948. A lien was
filed on August 6, 1948. On August 24, 1948, the town advertised the property for sale
for the 1947 tax, and on September 25, 1948, the property was sold. A temporary
receiver was appointed on August 12, 1949, and the town again sold the property on
September 24, 1949, for the 1948 taxes. The town bid in the property at its own sales,
but never took possession of the property, which was later sold by the receiver, creating
the fund involved in the proceeding.
80 Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N.H. 411, 90 A.2d 499 (1952). That court
also held the town was entitled to priority over the United States under § 3466.
It reasoned that the effect of the federal statute depends upon the status of the lien
at the time insolvency occurs and that since the property had been foreclosed by
advertisement and sale prior to the date of insolvency, the prerequisites for a valid
prior lien had been fulfilled.
Vol 1963: 449]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of its own internal administration, but that the interpretation of who
was a judgment creditor under section 3672 of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code was for federal courts to decide. The Court said
the town was not a judgment creditor because "in this instance, we
think Congress used the words 'judgment creditor' in section 3672
in the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record,
since all states have such courts." 31
While the Court concluded that the town was not a judgment
creditor, it did not decide whether or not the town's lien was choate
as against the Government's lien under section 3670 of the 1939 Code.
It would appear that a discussion of the rights of a judgment creditor
in an insolvency situation was academic in light of the decision of
the Supreme Court in Thelusson, wherein it was stated that a prior
judgment creditor was to be subordinated to the United States in
cases of insolvency under section 3466. The Court emphasized that
" 'specificity' requires that the lien be attached to certain property by
reducing it to possession, on the theory that the United States has
no claim against property no longer in the possession of the
debtor."3 2 Since the taxpayer had not been divested by the town
of either title or possession, the town had only a general, unperfected
lien.
The liens in all of these cases discussed under section 3466 were
inchoate for the reason that at the time the definitive act of in-
solvency occurred, something remained to be done to make them
specific and perfected. The amount of the lien or the identity of
the lienor may not have been definitely settled; necessary steps to
enforce the lien may not have been taken; or no particular property
of the debtor may have been segregated by title or possession from
the gross assets of the debtor to which the lien attaches. In the
main, the argument has resolved itself into a factual step by step
analysis which leaves the conclusion that something short of payment
always remains to be done to enforce any type of lien. As one
court has observed 3 under this reasoning, even a mortgage is not
perfected, since it too must be foreclosed to secure payment.
The requirements of the Supreme Court for a choate lien under
this section are so ineluctable that it has never found a competing
Si 345 U.S. at 364.
"I Id. at 366.
"1In re Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A.2d 210 (1946).
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lien that has met these standards. As a result, the question of
whether section 3466 awards priority to the Government over a prior
specific and perfected lien has yet to be decided by the Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, many state and lower federal courts hold the
section inapplicable as against a prior specific and perfected lien.3 4
The Supreme Court in the Conard case indicated a prior specific
and perfected lien will defeat the priority. The language is even
stronger in United States v. Knott.35 In that case the Court said an
inchoate general lien created by the laws of a state "lacks the char-
acteristics of a specific perfected lien which alone bars the priority
of the United States."36 Therefore, it is believed that the Supreme
Court will hold a specific and perfected lien defeats the federal
priority if the question is ever squarely presented to it.
II
SECTION 6321, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
This concept of a perfected lien, originally evolved under the
priority provisions of section 3466, has been carried over into the
tax lien field. The Government's rights as a lien claimant arise for
the most part from section 6321 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
The lien arises at the time of the assessment of unpaid taxes, unless
the competing liens are entitled to the protection of section 6323 (a),
which provides that the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be
valid "as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment
creditor" until notice has been filed as therein provided.37 It
creates a lien of sweeping application and covers all property and
rights to property of the taxpayer, after acquired 8 as well as property
exempt under state law. 9 It is a specific and perfected lien as of
the date of assessment, notice and demand having been duly made.40
The statute does not specify that the United States has a first lien,
0, United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954); State v.
Woodroof, 253 Ala. 620, 46 So. 2d 553 (1950); Ernst v. Guarantee Millwork, Inc., 93
P.2d 404 (Wash. 1939).
8- 293 U.S. 544 (1936).
20 Id. at 551.
37 United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1960).
"1 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
19 Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1942).
40 United States v. Kings County Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955); Cobb
v. United States, 172 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. City of Greenville, 118
F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941).
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or shall be paid first, as does the priority statute when the debtor is
insolvent. At one time this absence of priority language led some
courts to conclude that Congress by its silence sanctioned the right
of individual states to accord the federal tax lien whatever subordi-
nate position they desired.41
The initial question to be answered in a lien priority dispute
involving a federal tax lien is whether, and to what extent, the
taxpayer has property or rights to property to which the tax lien
can attach. This is to be determined by reference to state law.42
However, once the tax lien has attached to the taxpayer's property
interest, it is the federal law that determines the priority of com-
peting liens. 43 When the lien attaches to property of a delinquent
taxpayer, it can only be defeated in two ways. Competing lienors
may claim a prior choate and perfected lien entitled to precedence
under the rule that "the first in time is the first in right," or they
may seek to bring themselves within the classes of creditors spe-
cifically protected by section 6823 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code.44
The Government was not initially as successful in urging the
subordination of statutory liens competing with the federal tax lien,
as it had been in urging the subordination of such liens to the
section 8466 priority. The courts proceeded upon the premise that
the Government's liens for taxes attached subject to the right of other
lienholders. Most courts consistently applied the principle "the
first in time is the first in right" and awarded priority accordingly.
Where the federal tax lien was prior in time, the government won.
However, where the competing non-federal lien was prior in time,
the Government lost.45 In the late 1940's, however, the Government
began pressing for the application of the specific and perfected
doctrine to federal tax lien litigation. The reason behind this argu-
ment by analogy was clearly to bring tax lien litigation within the
rationale of section 8466 cases for the sake of uniform criteria in
'lIn re Mt. Jessup Coal Co., 7 F. Supp. 603 (M.D. Pa. 1934).
'42 Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Durham Lumber
Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
,8 Aquilino v. United States, supra note 42.
14 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Kings
County Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
,5 United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1946). The court said:
'There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 3670-72. . .. providing for gov-
ernment priority over inchoate liens which antedate its own liens."
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both areas. This argument was generally lost in lower federal and
state courts, which were unpersuaded by the necessity of harmony.48
In 1950 the government carried its argument by analogy to the
Supreme Court in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank.4 T
The case involved a contest between an attachment lien and the
federal tax lien. Certain real estate in California had been attached
by a creditor of the taxpayer on October 17, 1946, and judgment
was obtained on April 24, 1947. The United States filed notices of
tax liens on December 3, 5, and 10, 1946. Thus, notice of the
federal tax lien was recorded subsequent to the date of the attach-
ment lien but prior to the date the attaching creditor obtained
judgment. The state law provided that the lien of an attachment
on real property attached and became effective upon recording a
copy of the writ, together with a description attached.
In holding the attachment lien inchoate until perfected by a
judgment, the Court relied solely on prior decisions under section
8466. The Court held the competing lien inchoate because it had
to be enforced by a judgment within three years. In the meantime
numerous contingencies might arise that would prevent the attach-
ment lien from ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and
recorded. The government specifically argued that the federal tax
lien statute was designed to supplement, and serves purposes com-
parable to section 3466 and that the tax lien should attach to the
same property interests belonging to a tax delinquent as are reached
by that statute.4 The Supreme Court accepted the argument.49
Thus, the distinction between "specific and perfected" liens and in-
choate liens, which had long been used in the interpretation and
application of the priority statute, was engrafted by interpretation
on the tax lien statute, although that statute did not subordinate or
even mention inchoate liens.
The significance of the Security Trust decision cannot be over-
emphasized. The language of the Supreme Court, which appears
to accept the argument of the Government, set a precedent and estab-
lished the rule that federal tax liens are not to be subordinated to
10 See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YAm L.J. 905 (1954). This article presents
an excellent historical study and analysis of the federal tax lien through 1954.
1,340 U.S. 47 (1950).
18 See Felton, Federal Tax Liens: Their Priority and Enforcement, 10 DRAKE L.
Rav. 3, 13 (1960).
0 340 U.S. at 51.
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prior inchoate liens. Thus, the court drove a wedge into the "first
in time is first in right" principle. The applicable rule became "the
first specific and perfected in time is the first in right."
The next case to reach the Supreme Court was United States v.
City of New Britain.50 The question presented involved the rela-
tive priority of federal and municipal liens to the proceeds of a mort-
gage foreclosure sale of the property to which the liens attached.
The competing liens involved were for delinquent real estate taxes
and water rents which attached to specific real property. The federal
tax liens, the real estate tax liens, and the water rent liens arose
from time to time at various dates over a period of several years.
The law of Connecticut, where the case arose, provided that
real estate liens would take preference over all transfers and en-
cumbrances affecting the property subject to the lien. The water
rents, by state law, were given "precedence over all other liens or
encumbrances except taxes." The local courts agreed that the liens
were specific and perfected and that the city's liens were entitled to
priority over the United States. The Supreme Court held, on the
basis of the rules established in the cases under section 3466 and the
Security Trust case, that the characterization of the local tax liens
as specific and perfected was not conclusive on the federal govern-
ment; but it accepted "the holding as to the specificity of the
City's liens, since they attached to specific pieces of real property for
the taxes assessed and the water rent due," and added that "the
liens may also be perfected in the sense that there is nothing more
to be done to have a choate lien-when the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are estab-
lished." 1
The Court.held the city's liens were perfected since they attached
to specific pieces of real property. There was no doubt as to which
property the liens attached. The lienor could meet the requirement
of specificity as to property without title or possession. The Court
explicitly affirmed the specific and perfected doctrine as being
applicable to liens competing against the federal tax lien. While
the Court accepted the state court's holding as to the choateness of
the liens, it did not determine the date on which they became
choate. The question as to when the amount became specific still
had to be determined.
50 347 U.S. 81 (1954). 51 Id. at 84.
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This is the first occasion on which the Supreme Court concluded
that competing liens were choate. In comparing this case with
Security Trust and others decided under section 3466, it is im-
portant to observe that the Supreme Court noted these liens were
on specific realty and that the United States was free to pursue the
whole of the debtor's property wherever situated. The state, having
a lien only upon property within its boundaries, may not reach be-
yond the state line to fasten its lien upon other property. The
contingency or possibility of removal of personalty from the state
may, to some extent, result in a conclusion of inchoateness; whereas,
obviously real estate cannot be removed and real estate taxes are
definitely fixed as to amount at some fixed date, and the identity
of the lienor is established, as is the property subject to the lien.
As between the city's liens and the federal tax liens, the Court
followed the legal principle "the first in time is the first in right."
Of course, this principle is only applicable when the competing liens
are choate. Thus in New Britain the Court made explicit what was
implicit in Security Trust. The Court made no mention of the
requirement that the competing lienor have title or possession. Yet,
it stated their decision was not inconsistent with the Gilbert Associ-
ates case. In that case the Court stated that the taxpayer must be
divested of possession and concluded that the town's lien was general
and unperfected. In New Britain the city had not reduced its lien
to title or possession, yet had a choate lien. The Court resolved this
difference by distinguishing Gilbert Associates on the grounds that
it involved personalty and insolvency.
The Court's disregard of what had been a fatal defect in com-
peting liens where section 3466 was applicable suggests a difference
in the application of the choate lien doctrine to section 6321 cases.
Yet, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court has never
decided a case involving section 3466 where the competing lien was
on specific real property. Entirely apart from the merits of the
divestment requirement, it is submitted that the prerequisites to
the existence of a choate lien should be the same in both the tax
lien and priority statute cases. The whole concept is judicial gloss
resulting from the interpretation and correlation of the two statutes.
Having created the choate lien standard the court should apply an
identical criteria in the two types of cases.
The Supreme Court remanded the New Britain case back to the
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Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut for that court to determine
the order of priority of the various liens asserted. In determining
priority the court in Brown v. General Laundry Service52 held that
the lien of the city for real estate taxes depends not necessarily upon
when the state statute might say it arises, but, when in fact it becomes
choate. The city claimed that the assessment date of October 1 was
the date the lien became choate. The court said the lien was not
choate until the tax rate was set and that this was not done until the
January following the assessment date.
Thus, where a tax rate must be established by an assessment
board or council after the valuations have been made, it appears that
the local tax lien does not become fixed in amount until the rate
has been conclusively established. This is a sound rule if the liens
are to meet the conditions of choateness as established in the
New Britain case. Where a tax is on specific real property, the
requirements for choateness will be met whenever the tax rate
is established by an assessment board or council. It is only then
that the tax can be definitely ascertained.
The Security Trust case was followed in United States v. Acri,63
which arose in Ohio and involved an attachment lien. The tax lien
arose and the notice was filed subsequent to the attachment but be-
fore the judgment. The fact that under state law the attachment
lien was designated as "an execution in advance" and treated as a
perfected lien at the time of the attachment did not make the lien
choate. The Supreme Court held the attachment lien inchoate,
saying: "We hold here that the attachment lien in Ohio is for
federal tax purposes an inchoate lien because, at the time the attach-
ment issued, the fact and the amount of the lien were contingent
upon the outcome of the suit for damages."5 4 In both the Security
Trust and Acri cases, the attachment liens were in essence held to
be no more than a lis pendens notice that a right to perfect a lien
existed, a caveat of a more perfect lien to come and, thus, con-
tingent and inchoate since at the time the attachment issued, the
fact and the amount of the lien were contingent upon the outcome
of the suit for damages.
52 19 Conn. Supp. 335, 113 A.2d 601 (1955). See also Streeter Bros. v. Overfelt, 202
F. Supp. 143 (D. Mont. 1962), where the court followed the same reasoning.
3 348 U.S. 211 (1955), reversing 209 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1953), which affirmed 109 F.
Supp. 943 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
5 4Id. at 214.
THE CHOATE LIEN DOCTRINE
As in the case of attachment, a garnishment under state law which
is dependent for perfection upon obtaining a judgment and the
issuance of execution in the related action is subordinate to the
federal tax lien.55 Thus, it seems that attachment or garnishment
proceedings are merely notices to acquire a lien yet to arise and
therefore are inchoate; that they are contingent interests which are
not determined until judgment; that even judgments are not enough
where state law requires more to be done to secure a judgment lien.
This latter requirement has long been recognized by the federal
courts.5 6 A creditor with a garnishment or attachment lien is not
able to eliminate the contingent nature of his claim prior to judg-
ment. A judgment would, however, fix the amount of the lien on
the debt owed by the garnishee because the doctrine of res judicata
would bar any later attack on the amount of the lien by the debtor.
In United States v. Scovil" a landlord's distress lien for rent
was held inchoate because state law provided that the tenant might
put up a bond and free the property from the distress lien and
reacquire any interest the landlord may have had in the property.
Notice of the federal tax lien was filed on April 10, 1952, but the
assessments were made in 1951 and in February, 1952, prior to the
landlord obtaining a distress warrant. The state court held that
notice of the Government's tax lien had to be filed in order to be
good against a landlord's lien which had been perfected. It reasoned
that a perfected landlord's lien made the landlord a purchaser. The
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning by saying that the landlord
was not a purchaser, for such "usually means one who acquires
title for a valuable consideration in the manner of vendor and
vendee."58
The Government's tax liens arose long before the landlord ob-
55 United States v. Liverpool & London Se Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955),
reversing 209 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1953), which affirmed sub inor. Sunnyland Wholesale
Furniture Co. v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Tex.
1952). The garnisher had attached insurance proceeds due the debtor before the
assessment lists had been received in the office of the District Director, but the tax lien
was filed and notice thereof with warrants of distraint and levy was served on the
garnishee before the garnisher's claim was reduced to judgment. Since the garnisher
had not reduced his claim to judgment, the amount was not definitely determinable.
Thus, the standards of a choate lien were not met.
56 Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3rd Cir. 1956); Miller v. Bank of America, 166
F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948); Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957); United
States v. Record Pub. Co., 60 F. Supp. 194 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
5 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
" Id. at 221.
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tained a distress warrant. Since the landlord was not a purchaser,
there was no need for a notice of the tax lien to be recorded. Under
these circumstances the landlord would have only been entitled to
priority if he had possessed a choate lien prior to the date the
assessments for taxes were made. Taxes were assessed on March 19,
1951, May 24, 1951, August 29, 1951, December 3, 1951, February
23, 1952, and February 28, 1952. The rent was for the months of
February, March, and April, 1952. The tax liens had all attached
to the tenant-taxpayer's property before the rent for March and
April had become due. These facts make it apparent that the land-
lord's lien could not even satisfy the requirement that the amount
be specific prior to the time the federal tax liens arose. Moreover,
the landlord's lien was general in the sense that it only attached to
property that might be on the rented premises at the time the distress
warrant was issued. Until the distress warrant was issued the land-
lord had no way of knowing exactly what property was available to
pay the rent.
There is no doubt that the landlord's lien was inchoate at the
time the tax liens arose, but the language of the Court goes even fur-
ther in saying that the landlord's lien was inchoate at the time notice
of the tax liens was filed. Once the Court found filing notice of the
tax liens was unnecessary, it would seem there was no need to hold
the lien inchoate as of that date. If the landlord had already taken
possession of the property by distraint, then the language of the
Court must be interpreted to mean that irrevocable title or posses-
sion is required before such liens can be perfected. The landlord
could not have sold the property until the tenant had failed to give
bond.
The most striking application of the doctrine of perfected liens
applies in the mechanic lien field. Here, unless the laborer or
materialmen can show that the delinquent taxpayer had no state-
created property rights under the Durham Lumber Co.,"9 Aquil-
ino,60 and Chapman6l decisions, it is virtually impossible for him
59 United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960). The Supreme Court
deferred to the fourth circuit in allowing the claims of subcontractors against the
claims of the United States for taxes of the main contractor, upon the theory that
under North Carolina law the main contractor had "no property interest" except in
the surplus remaining after the subcontractors were paid.
GOAquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960). The Court implied the sub-
contractor would prevail over the tax lien if, under local law, payments received by the
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to prevail upon the lien priority basis. The Supreme Court has
decided four 62 mechanics' lien cases, all by per curiam opinion
which provide no direct answer or explanation to the problem of
choateness. In White Bear,63 which is representative of all these
cases, the priority of the federal lien was extended over a statutory
mechanic lien, where the mechanic's work had been completed,
notice of his mechanic lien had been duly filed in strict compliance
with state law and foreclosure proceedings on the lien were actually
pending in the state court, all before the tax lien arose by assessment.
All that was lacking was a final judgment enforcing the mechanic's
lien which would set at rest any possibility of controversy over the
amount owing. In a dissent Justices Douglas and Harlan stated
they would apply "the first in time is first in right" principle stated
in New Britain and hold the competing mechanic lien was specific
and choate.64
In all the mechanic lien cases decided by the Supreme Court, the
private lienor was identifiable and the property was easily identified,
since the lien attached to the particular property that was improved.
The amount was presumably the outstanding balance, but the
Supreme Court made it clear that the amount was not definite until
it was reduced to judgment. The liens were inchoate since no judg-
ment had been obtained and the later federal tax liens prevailed.
Perhaps the theory of the Court was that the mechanic's lien was not a
property right, but only a substitute for a property right or an intent
to assert a property right. Apparently the Court believed the im-
proved property, although created by the mechanics, was property
prime contractor were held in trust for subcontractors to the extent of the latter's
claim.
01 United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1960). The court stated that
under the law of forum, the failure of the contractor to perform the condition precedent
of proving payment of all labor and materialmen's claims negated the possibility of
his acquiring any property or rights to property in the retained percentage. The
construction contracts required the contractor to prove satisfaction of all labor and
material claims before being paid a retained percentage of the contract price.
82 United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958), reversing 102 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1958);
United States v. Vorreiter, 335 U.S. 15 (1957), reversing 134 Colo. 543, 307 P.2d
475 (1957); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing
227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955), reversing
224 Miss. 33, 79 So. 2d 474 (1955).
03 United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., supra note 62.
64Id. at 1011. The dissent concluded: "The court apparently holds that under 26
U.S.C. § 3670 a lien that is specific and choate under state law, no matter how dili-
gently enforced, can never prevail against a subsequent federal tax lien, short of
reducing the lien to final judgment." Ibid.
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"belonging to" the taxpayer, within the meaning of the tax lien law;
and that the mechanic's lien was not a choate right in that property
but only an opportunity to obtain a property right by completing
enforcement action. Thus, it seems that no statutory mechanic or
materialman's lien can be deemed an interest in property until it
has been reduced to judgment.
Prior to 1958 the choateness test and its strict application had
combined to award priority to the Government, first in cases involv-
ing insolvency of the taxpayer and then in tax lien cases where the
competing lien was statutory in nature. In the R. F. Ball case"a a
new element was introduced-the contractual lien. Ball Construc-
tion Company had contracted to construct a housing project in San
Antonio, Texas. On July 17, 1951, it entered into a subcontract
with Jacobs for certain work which required Jacobs to furnish to
Ball a surety bond, guaranteeing performance of the subcontract.
On July 21, 1951, Jacobs, to induce respondent United Pacific Ins.
Co. to sign the bond as surety, assigned to the surety all sums due
or to become due under the subcontract, as collateral security to the
surety for any liability it might sustain under its bond through non-
performance of the subcontract, and for "the payment of any other
indebtedness or liability" of the subcontractor to the surety "whether
heretofore or thereafter incurred."
On April 30, 1953, a balance of $13,228.55 became due from
Ball under the subcontract, but because of outstanding claims of
materialmen against Jacobs, Ball did not pay the debt. In May,
June, and September, 1953, the District Director of Internal Revenue
filed notices of federal tax liens against Jacobs totaling $17,010.85.
Between December, 1953, and March, 1954, Jacobs incurred in-
debtedness, independent of the subcontract, to the surety in the
amount of $12,971.88. The surety, contending that its assignment
of July 21, 1951, constituted it a "mortgagee," claimed priority of
right to the fund since notice of the federal tax liens had not been
filed prior to the date of the assignment.
The Supreme Court rendered a per curiam decision holding the
surety had only an inchoate interest and that the provisions of section
3672 did not apply. It cited the Security Trust and New Britain
5 United States v. R. F. Ball Const. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), reversing 239 F.2d
384 (5th Cir. 1956), which affirmed 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1960). Both lower
courts had held the assignee to be a "pledgee" or "mortgagee," protected by what is
now § 6323 (a) of the 1954 Code.
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decisions as authority. Justice Whittaker wrote the opinion for
the four dissenters. He stated New Britain and Security Trust were
not applicable and that the assignment constituted a mortgage in the
ordinary and common law sense. He pointed out that the state
law of Texas made such assignment a valid mortgage and that while
the relation of a state created right to federal laws for the collection
of federal taxes is a federal question, the state's classification of state-
created rights must be given weight. He believed the assignment
was in legal effect a mortgage, completely perfected on its date, in
all respects choate, and valid between the parties. Since it antedated
the filing of notices of the federal tax liens, he believed it was express-
ly made superior to those liens by the terms of what is now section
6323 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. However, the majority
obviously possessed the opinion that an assignee for security of an
undetermined, contingent amount, who had contemporaneously
advanced no money, was not a "mortgagee" within the meaning
of that section.
The lien was inchoate even though the taxpayer's property rights
were completely assigned as collateral security to the surety on the
bond, in full compliance with state law, and long before the federal
tax liens arose. At the time of the assignment, Ball was not indebted
to the assignor-taxpayer. In effect the assignment was not of accounts
presently receivable, but of accounts to become receivable under an
executory contract, which was contingent on Ball becoming indebted
to the taxpayer on the contract. Furthermore, the amount of the lien,
though completely incurred and utterly inescapable, had not become
fixed and definite in amount. By the assignment, the taxpayer not
only secured the full performance of his agreements under a bond,
but he also secured "the payments of any other indebtedness or
liability.., whether heretofore or hereafter incurred.... ." There-
fore, it would appear the lien was inchoate on two grounds. The
property right assigned was not specific and constant and the amount
of the lien was contingent and uncertain. This would appear to be
in complete harmony with previous decisions of the Court.
In the recent case of Crest Finance Co. v. United States"6 the
Court was again confronted with a contractual lien competing against
the federal tax lien. Crest Finance loaned money to the taxpayer-
6- 368 U.S. 347 (1961). reversing 291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961), which affirmed sub noma.
United States v. Standard Paving Co., 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9774 (N.D. I1. 1960).
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subcontractor from March 21, 1958, through June 10, 1958, and
received several promissory notes secured by assignments of accounts
receivable. The accounts receivable were in existence and owed
at the time of the assignments. They consisted of periodic progress
payments then owed by the principal contractor to the taxpayer, but
which at the time were not collectible. The notes provided that
the accounts were pledged as security, and the assignment instru-
ments included a schedule of assigned accounts which listed the
specific account assigned.
On August 15, November 7, and November 14, 1958, the District
Director made an assessment for federal withholding and social
security taxes against the taxpayer-subcontractor. At the time of
the assessment, the principal contractor was indebted to the taxpayer
and the United States served a notice of levy on them on October 9,
1958. The principal contractor filed an action for interpleader and
paid the account due into the registry of the court.
Crest claimed priority on two grounds: (1) that it was a pledgee
and entitled to the protection of section 6323; and (2) that its liens,
based on the assignments of the taxpayer's receivables were choate
prior to the filing of the notice of the tax lien according to the stand-
ards set forth in New Britain. The court of appeals, affirming
the district court decision, inexplicably found it unnecessary to
determine whether the lender was a pledgee under section 6323, but
stated that it was required under previous Supreme Court decisions
to hold that Crest's liens were not perfected. To reach this result
the Court did little more than state its decision was controlled by
the Ball case and three cases which followed it.e  It further reasoned
that the fact the assignment was to secure a present and existing
indebtedness, as opposed to a future or contingent indebtedness in
Ball would not make an otherwise unperfected lien choate.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court on the choate
lien question and remanded the case for a determination of whether
67 United States v. Chapman, 281 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1960); Arthur Company v.
Chicago Paints, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 50 (D. Minn. 1959); First State Bank v. United States,
166 F. Supp. 204 (D. Minn. 1958). In both the First State Bank and Chapman cases,
it was argued that the assignment in Ball was given to secure a contingent or future
indebtedness and that the assignments under consideration by those courts were given
to secure a present and ascertained indebtedness. The court in First State Batk dis-
credited this by saying it was a distinguishing characteristic but that the distinction
did not perfect an unperfected lien. This langage was also followed in Chapman.
The reasoning of those courts is somewhat fallacious in view of the fact that this was
one of the reasons the Supreme Court in Ball seems to have held the lien inchoate.
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or not the assignments of the accounts receivable were valid under
state law without recordation. The Solicitor General conceded the
liens were choate if the assignments were valid under state law
without recordation. On remand,68 the court of appeals held no
recordation was necessary and that the liens were choate.
The decision indicates that there is a distinction between an
assignment for a present and existing indebtedness as opposed to one
for a future or contingent indebtedness. In Ball the amount of the
indebtedness was not fixed by the time the tax lien arose; whereas, in
Crest the indebtedness could be definitely determined prior to the
time the first tax lien came into being. Furthermore Crest would
seem to indicate that where assignments, which are valid under state
law, of present and existing accounts receivable are made as security
for a loan, the property subject to the lien is specific. The assign-
ment in Ball was not of accounts presently receivable, but of ac-
counts to become receivable. Thus, it would seem that any con-
tractual lien which results from an assignment of present and exist-
ing accounts receivable, or other security, for a present and existing
indebtedness will meet the strict standards of choateness.
III
CONCLUSION
The choate lien doctrine is one of the most misunderstood and
misquoted principles that has ever been construed by the Supreme
Court. Many courts simply do not understand the requirements of
a choate lien; others feel it is too harsh and refuse to follow it; still
others resolve the conflict without mentioning or discussing the
pivotal factors which must be taken into consideration in deter-
mining whether the federal standards of choateness were actually
satisfied. In deciding in favor of a given local lien, they have been
content to set out an unsupported conclusion ascribing choateness
to the local lien as of a certain date.
Generally speaking, the identity of the lienor rarely causes
any difficulty in ascertaining whether or not a lien is choate. The
requirement that the amount be specific presents a much greater
hazard to the competing statutory lienor. It seems clear that a
statutory lien which must be enforced with the aid of the courts can
"8 302 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1962).
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not be accorded priority over a subsequently arising federal lien or
the federal priority in insolvency, unless there has been a final judg-
ment setting at rest any possible controversy over the amount that
is owed. Statutory liens which are enforceable by levy and sale,
without having to go to court, are also affected by the requirement
that the amount of the lien be certain. The amount must be fixed
by assessment and the administrative remedies for contesting it must
be exhausted or foregone before the amount can be definitely de-
termined. Therefore, in order for any competing statutory lien to
be definite in amount, it must be fixed beyond any possibility of
administrative or judicial review.
Where the competing lien is contractual, it is somewhat easier
to comply with the requirement that the lien be specific in amount.
The Crest decision implies that any lien for a present and existing
indebtediess, as opposed to a contingent and undetermined amount,
will meet the requirement. If this be the case, it would seem that
where future as well as present advances are made, the creditor or
lender, with reference to the future advances, will be able to meet
the requirement of specificity of amount if the future advance is
actually made before the federal lien arises. Under these circum-
stances, a definite amount of present and existing indebtedness can
be ascertained prior to the time the federal tax lien arises.
Once the lien is specific in amount, it still must meet a stringent
application of the standard of identification of the property subject
to the lien. In some instances this not only means that the property
must be identified, but also that it must be reduced to title or
possession. The New Britain and Crest decisions make it clear that
divestiture of title or possession is not required when taxes are on
specific real property, or the competing lien is contractual in nature
and valid under state law against third parties. However, if a con-
tractual lien does not name specific property which is in being at
the time of the assignment and is constant, it is doubtful it can be
regarded as choate. The specificity of property standards will prob-
ably not be met where the property in question is a changing rather
than a constant mass. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that a general
lien on all the taxpayer's property will be recognized as choate
unless it is reduced to title or possession. In most instances such
liens will require selection and until distraint is made by the com-
peting lienor, he does not know what propetry is available to pay
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the lien. Consequently, it is believed that in cases where the com-
peting liens are not taxes on real property or contractual in nature,
they will not prevail over the federal tax lien or insolvency priority
unless the debtor has been divested of title or possession before the
tax lien or insolvency arises.
Much of the confusion surrounding the choate lien doctrine
probably evolves from the failure to recognize that while the three
requirements for determining a choate lien must always be met, they
do not remain uniform in their application to all competing liens.
For instance, certain competing lienors must reduce their liens to
judgment in order to be specific in amount, while others do not have
to obtain a judgment to meet the requirement. The requirement
that the lien attach to specific property is satisfied in some cases with-
out the property being reduced to title or possession, while in others
title or possession of the property is necessary. This lack of uniform-
ity results because the concept of "choateness" varies under differing
circumstances. The various definitions rest heavily on the nature
of the lien itself and the circumstances in which the lien arises.
Due to these factors, it is impossible to state any hard and fast rules
that are applicable in all cases. Each case must be resolved by a
factual step by step determination.
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